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I. INTRODUCTION
“She brought a small town to its feet and a huge company to its knees.” 1
This is the tagline of the blockbuster movie Erin Brockovich, a
true story of how a single mother recovered an enormous settlement
on behalf of a victimized rural town. It portrays the conventional
view that class action lawsuits frequently pit the successful underdog
against the powerful and greedy corporation.
However, the history and development of class action litigation in
the United States has been much less idealistic and straightforward.
There has been an enormous amount of debate regarding reform for
both the allegedly underdog plaintiffs and the mighty corporations.
These discussions have resulted in the passage of several pieces of
legislation. The most recent was the culmination of much legislative
debate, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).



∗ J.D. 2011, Florida State University College of Law; B.A. 2006, University of
Georgia. I am grateful to my parents for all of their love and support throughout the years,
and to Professor Tara Grove for her insightful input and teaching me that statutory
interpretation can, in fact, be a very interesting topic. Thank you also to all of my friends,
including Lauren Morrissette for her many pearls of “wisdom”; my mentor, John Marino;
and the editors of Florida State University Law Review.
1. ERIN BROCKOVICH (Jersey Films 2000).
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On February 18, 2005, the 109th Congress passed CAFA, and it
was signed into law by President George H.W. Bush.2 The nearly
immediate result was a broad overhaul of the manner in which class
action lawsuits are litigated and resolved. The primary changes
included the following: (1) increased judicial scrutiny of proposed
“coupon settlements” and notice provided to litigants, (2) the
significant expansion of diversity jurisdiction, (3) jurisdictional
exceptions for when a federal district court must and may refuse to
accept a class action case, (4) appellate procedures for dealing with
remand orders, and (5) the implementation of a monitoring system to
be put in place to hold practitioners and the judiciary accountable for
its disposition of class action lawsuits.
These changes have had, and will continue to have, an enormous
impact on the field of class action litigation. They have evoked mixed
reactions from practitioners, academic commentators, and the
judiciary. When Congress initially began to consider a proper vehicle
for reform, the foremost concerns involved the need to alleviate the
abusive practices of plaintiffs’ attorneys receiving excessive fees and
ensure that more adequate representation would be provided to class
members.3 However, that focus began to shift as discussions
progressed and the focus turned to “forum shopping.”4 This practice
occurs when class members seek the most promising state court
forum and attempt to avoid the federal forum by adding diversitydestroying parties or bringing claims where individual class member
damages are below the threshold required for diversity jurisdiction.5
The Senate Judiciary Report noted that this practice results in the
inconsistent treatment of similar litigation, which frequently
contravenes basic fairness and due process considerations.6 Others
have expressed additional concerns as to whether a shift from
individual lawsuits to a group pursuit of justice tends to deprive a
litigant of having his well-established “day in court.”7
These abusive practices did not just emerge in recent years.
Moreover, the large settlements or jury verdicts achieved by class
plaintiffs have adversely affected consumers because the expense is
eventually passed on in the form of rising costs. These rising costs


2. Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711-15 (2006). Courts have
consistently upheld the February 18, 2005 effective date. See, e.g., Bush v. Cheaptickets,
Inc., 425 F.3d 683, 684 (9th Cir. 2005); Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1094
(10th Cir. 2005); Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 805, 806 (7th Cir. 2005).
3. Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80
TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1594-95 (2006).
4. Id. at 1595.
5. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and
the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1854 (2008).
6. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 29-30 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 28-29).
7. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989).
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have played a major role in the significant amount of public
discontent, along with a general distrust for the legal system, which
has continued to proliferate and resulted in attempts at reform by
previous legislatures.8
The Senate Judiciary Committee has conducted hearings focused
on similar legislation since the late 1990s. In 2003, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23 was amended to reflect CAFA’s focus on
reforming the class action process. The amendments dealt with four
main areas: (1) the timeline for certification decisions and notice, (2)
judicial oversight of class action settlements, (3) the appointment of
class counsel, and (4) the compensation structure for class counsel.9
Although the amendments to FRCP 23 were noted as progress in the
right direction, further reform was needed.
In 2001 and again in 2003, legislation for a Class Action Fairness
Act was proposed, but both failed to receive adequate votes in the
House and Senate to become law.10 Both versions had attempted to
implement the following changes, most of which were later
incorporated into CAFA: the establishment of a consumer class
action bill of rights dealing with settlements and compensation for
class counsel, the expansion of federal diversity jurisdiction over any
civil action in which the aggregate amount of the claims exceeds $2
million, the abrogation of the requirement for complete diversity
between the class members and all defendants, and provisions for
carve-outs from federal jurisdiction for local controversies.11
CAFA is the culmination of ongoing reform efforts and legislative
debates. It addresses the many criticisms of the class action process
as it existed prior to its passage. However, there has been
controversy surrounding the interpretation and application of specific
portions of CAFA. The controversy is largely the result of alleged
disparities between the plain language of CAFA and the legislative
history supporting it.
To date, there have already been a number of cases dealing with
these disparities and the effect they have had on the application of
the new procedures. These cases have, in some situations, resulted in
inconsistent treatment by various courts, which is in direct


8. See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. 2083 CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 1998
(1998), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s105-2083; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S.
353 CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2000 (2000), http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=s108-2062.
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c), (e), (g), (h).
10. See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. 1712 CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2001
(2001), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s107-1712&tab=summary; see also
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. 1751 CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2003 (2003),
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s108-1751&tab=summary.
11. See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. 1712 CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2001
(2001), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s107-1712&tab=summary.
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contradiction with the stated purpose of CAFA “to assure fair and
prompt recoveries for class members with legitimate claims.”12 Only
time will tell whether there will be a need for the United States
Supreme Court to interpret the key provisions that are providing so
much room for interpretation, or if Congress will be able to
adequately intervene by passing corrective legislative measures.
This Note discusses the dispute between two schools of statutory
interpretation as they apply to CAFA: textualists, who adhere to the
plain language of CAFA, and purposivists, who consult the legislative
history in order to ascertain Congress’s intent and purpose to resolve
any ambiguous provisions. Part II provides a history of class action
litigation and a brief description of previous attempts at mass tort
reform. Part III provides an overview of the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005. Part IV discusses a few primary ambiguous provisions
and how they have been handled by courts since CAFA’s enactment
in 2005, including a discussion of the textualist and purposivist
perspectives. Part V concludes by recommending that, in order to
reconcile the purposes of CAFA and the underlying sentiments
expressed in legislative materials, courts should adopt a textual
approach when interpreting CAFA and allow Congress to enact
corrective legislation to resolve any significant ambiguities.
II. THE HISTORY OF CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
A. Becoming a Massively Powerful Tool for Litigators
Although class action litigation began in common law England as
representative lawsuits, it was not until the 1800s that this method
became available to litigants in the United States.13 The first federal
group litigation provision, Equity Rule 48, was passed in 1842 and
served as an exception to the compulsory joinder rule that had been
imported from England.14 It has been noted that fundamental
changes occurred when Federal Equity Rule 38 succeeded Equity
Rule 48 in 1912, because representative suits were then permitted
when there were simply too many parties to join and absent parties
could finally be bound by the final judgment.15
The twentieth century ushered in an era of massive procedural
reform in American law. Class actions were one device in particular
need of improvement. A leading legal scholar of that time, Zechariah


12. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 30.
13. 1 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:9
(4th ed. 2002).
14. See Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action Part II: Interest,
Class, and Representation, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1067, 1091 (1980); CONTE & NEWBERG, supra
note 13, § 1:9.
15. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig, 129 B.R. 710, 804 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992).
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Chafee, helped bring this issue to the forefront after publishing an
essay that advocated for class actions as a judicially economical tool
that required further reform.16 However, Chafee went on to
formulate a fundamental question: “whether the mere existence of
multiple parties with parallel legal claims or defenses was sufficient
to create equitable jurisdiction, or whether an additional, independent
equitable factor (such as prayers for injunction or for the rescission
or cancellation of instruments) was necessary.”17 Chafee completed a
thorough analysis that began with the occurrence of bills of peace
being used to settle disputes between tenants and lords along with
parishioners and vicars, before concluding that “[f]rom such a bill of
peace it was a natural step to the representative suit.”18 In order to
take into account the focus on judicial economy while balancing the
growing concern for litigants’ autonomy, the drafters of FRCP 23
permitted (but neither required nor motivated) individual members
of the class to organize.19
The initial version of FRCP 23 was significantly similar to the
former Equity Rule 38 and attempted to categorize class suits in
terms of jural relations between parties.20 The 1938 version of FRCP
23 had three designations for class suits.21 The first two designations,
true and hybrid, were considered narrow and required a “joint” or
“common” interest, or a “several” interest in a specific property,
respectively.22 The third, which was known as the spurious action,
had a far broader reach and required only a common question of law
or fact and common relief.23 The primary focus was that there had to
be a notion of privity or unified interest between the parties making
the claim.24
Professor Moore, who was a principal drafter of the original Rule
23, helped clarify the extent to which the judgment was binding on
the parties because the preliminary draft of the rule itself was silent
on the issue.25 A sliding scale of binding effect was proposed and


16. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1297 (1932).
17. Yeazell, supra note 14, at 1099 (citing ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS
OF EQUITY 156 (1950)).
18. Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the
Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866, 868 (1977) (quoting CHAFEE, supra note 17, at 200-01).
19. Yeazell, supra note 14, at 1102.
20. CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 13, § 1:9.
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), 308 U.S. 689 (1939) (repealed 1966); see also James E.
Starrs, The Consumer Class Action—Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U. L. REV.
407, 463 (1969).
22. See Starrs, supra note 21, at 463 & n.348 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)).
23. Starrs, supra note 21, at 464.
24. Adolf Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REV.
609, 615 (1971).
25. See James Wm. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by
the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. L.J. 551, 571 (1937).
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widely accepted by most courts: the judgment would bind all
members of a true class action and all appearing parties, and would
be conclusive as to all claims concerning the property in a hybrid
class action, and bind only the appearing parties in a spurious class
action.26 Numerous difficulties arose as courts attempted to fit class
action lawsuits within one of these categories, and many parties
disputed the judgment’s binding effect. As a result, FRCP 23 was
completely rewritten when it was amended in 1966.27
After the 1966 amendments, FRCP 23 set forth more practical
requirements for when a class action may be initiated and eliminated
the concept of a jural relationship.28 The four preliminary
requirements for certification that apply to all class actions are
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation.29
Subsection (b) added further requirements based on functional
distinctions, such as the relief sought or whether all necessary
interests would be represented without aggregating the claims.30 The
provision that provided the most resounding change was clearly
subdivision (b)(3). It provided that a class action may be brought
when the prerequisites of Subsection (a) are met, the court
determines that questions of law or fact common to members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and a class action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.31
That version of FRCP 23 drastically changed the playing field and
was the source of a dramatic increase in class action litigation that
began in 1966.32 No longer were parties required to be connected by
united interest or privity so long as there was a common factual or
legal issue. This new rule allowed completely unassociated people to
come together and make a claim that resulted in a case of
considerable stature.33 The most powerful element of the amended
rule was that judgments had a binding effect on all class members
rather than being limited to those who actually participated directly
in the litigation.34 Furthermore, this new device benefitted plaintiffs
because litigation of relatively minor claims “afford[ed] aggrieved
persons a remedy when it [was] not economically feasible to obtain


26. See id.
27. CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 13, § 1:9.
28. Id. § 1:10.
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
30. See CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 13, § 3:1.
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b); see also generally CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 13, § 1:10.
32. James M. Underwood, Rationality, Multiplicity & Legitimacy: Federalization of
the Interstate Class Action, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 391, 401 (2004).
33. Carol Rice Andrews, The Personal Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked in the
National Debate About “Class Action Fairness”, 58 SMU L. REV. 1313, 1315-17 (2005).
34. CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 13, § 1:10.
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relief through the traditional framework of multiple individual
damage actions as, for example, when each claim involve[d] only a
small dollar amount.”35
B. Procedural Questions Arise as Class Actions Proliferate
Although class actions were originally intended for civil rights
litigants to use in combating segregation, courts transitioned from
hostility and skepticism to greater acceptance for certifying classes
with claims that were well outside that initial scope.36 The 1966
amendments to FRCP Rule 23 were largely to blame for the
increased amount of large, multistate class action cases, which grew
out of the amendments’ innovative and expanded version of class
actions based on “ ‘common issues’ of law and fact.”37 However, the
Supreme Court handed down three decisions in the 1970s that
deterred these cases from being filed in federal court and, in fact,
made it very difficult for these cases to be litigated in federal
court at all.38
The first case interpreted the federal diversity statute to require
complete diversity, meaning no class member could be the resident of
a state in which any defendant, whether an individual or corporate
entity, resides. Every class member had to meet the statutory
jurisdictional amount,39 which is currently $75,000.40 Soon after, the
Court held that FRCP 23(c)(2) required individual notice to class
members in a FRCP 23(b)(3) damages claim and that during the
litigation, the plaintiff must bear the exorbitant cost of providing
such notice.41 Finally, the Court found that the “final decision”
statute governing appellate jurisdiction did not permit interlocutory
review of class certification decisions,42 which resulted in remand
decisions having to wait until after final disposition before they could
be reconsidered. Those three decisions essentially closed the federal
courthouse doors to most class action lawsuits.
Although the doors to the federal courthouse had effectively closed
to a great majority of class actions, the doors to the state courts did
not readily swing open. Many state courts questioned whether they
could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over unnamed plaintiffs


35. 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.02 (Daniel R.
Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 1997) (citing cases).
36. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 7 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 7.
37. Purcell, supra note 5, at 1851 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)).
38. Andrews, supra note 33, at 1318.
39. Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (citing Steele v. Guar. Trust Co.
of N.Y., 164 F.2d 387, 388 (2d Cir. 1947)).
40. 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) (2006).
41. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176, 177 n.14 (1974).
42. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 464-65 (1978).
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in a multistate lawsuit.43 Other state courts were skeptical as to
whether they had the authority and ability to decide cases that
involved nonlocal claims.44 The Supreme Court, in Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, provided an answer to both questions posed by state
courts and ultimately encouraged filings in state court.45 This case
held that a state court does not violate due process regardless of
whether minimum contacts exist when it asserts personal
jurisdiction over absent members of a Rule 23(b)(3) plaintiff class so
long as absent members have been given an opt-out notice.46 The
Court went on to hold that there is a lesser burden on a plaintiff to
travel to an out-of-state venue than on a defendant, especially when
the plaintiff already has adequate representation provided by the
class counsel.47 The Court also held that a state court has the
authority to exercise its discretion in a choice of law decision so long
as the choice is “ ‘neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.’ ”48 An
important element in the fairness analysis is whether the parties had
an expectation that they would be governed by the choice of law.49
Then, in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, the Court increased the appeal
of state forums even further by refusing to review a choice of law
decision in a multistate class action on the basis that the other
potentially relevant state laws were sufficiently similar to those of
the forum.50 Therefore, state courts had been granted the
discretionary authority to further their traditional tendency to be
plaintiff-friendly forums, and plaintiffs frequently exploited
this opportunity.
During this same time, federal courts consistently refused to
certify class action lawsuits based on mass tort claims, primarily
because the drafters of the 1966 amendment stated “that mass
accident cases ‘ordinarily are not appropriate’ for class action
treatment.”51 However, in light of the need for greater judicial
efficiency, federal courts eventually began to look beyond that
comment and consider certifying mass tort claims.52 Federal courts
began to grant class certification for a multitude of mass tort claims,
including cases involving asbestos-related claims, tobacco-related
illnesses, complications that resulted from faulty silicone implants,


43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Andrews, supra note 33, at 1320.
Id.
472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985).
Id. at 812.
See id. at 808, 811.
Id. at 818 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)).
Id. at 822.
See 486 U.S. 717, 730-31 (1988).
Andrews, supra note 33, at 1325 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note).
Id. at 1325.
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and alleged pharmaceutical drug contaminations.53 This effort was
effectively thwarted by the availability of the opt-out provision in
Rule 23(b)(3) and its increased use by defendants.54 The opt-out
provision allows
[a]n unnamed member who feels it cannot be adequately
represented by named defendants or by counsel for unnamed
defendants [to] have the opportunity to “opt out” of the suit and
not be bound by the judgment or to be represented by a lawyer of
his own choice. The opportunity for exclusion is adequate
protection for whatever due process rights are not satisfied by
actual notice and representation by the named defendant or by
counsel for unnamed defendants.55

This provision ensured that parties who may be responsible for a
considerable portion of the loss suffered by the class members were
able to effectively insulate themselves from monetary liability, thus
undermining a large portion of a potential settlement or verdict.
As a result, plaintiffs again took up the practice of forum-shopping
to bring their claims in increasingly plaintiff-friendly state forums.56
Multistate class actions gave state courts a great amount of power to
decide issues of national importance that would significantly affect a
distinctly federal issue: interstate commerce.57 This concern was
declared “ ‘false federalism’ ” by CAFA supporters and mentioned
throughout the Senate and House reports in the development of
CAFA.58 However, an opposing point of view was expressed in Sun
Oil Co. v. Wortman when the Court stated,
[t]o constitute a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause or
the Due Process Clause, it is not enough that a state court
misconstrue the law of another State. Rather, our cases make
plain that the misconstruction must contradict law of the other
State that is clearly established and that has been brought to the
court’s attention.59

The Supreme Court decisions encouraged ambivalence towards
defendants’ constitutional right to due process. These decisions also
furthered a growing problem: a lack of communication and control

53. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1344 & n.2 (1995).
54. Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an Analysis of
Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85, 94 (1997).
55. Appleton Electric Co. v. Advance–United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126, 140
(7th Cir. 1974).
56. Glenn A. Danas, Comment, The Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999:
Another Congressional Attempt to Federalize State Law, 49 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1320-26 (2000).
57. Purcell, supra note 5, at 1854.
58. Id. at 1854 & n.111 (quoting S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 62 (2005), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 57).
59. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730-31 (1988).
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between the class of plaintiffs and class counsel, which would result
in counsel making critical representative decisions without first
consulting the class members. Potential conflicts of interest began to
emerge between class members as disagreements occurred as to the
manner in which to resolve their claims.60 As class members began to
lose a greater amount of control over the litigation, greater
opportunities began to arise for class counsel to collude with the
defendants61 in settlement discussions in order to ensure the
attorneys benefitted even when the class itself did not.
An additional abusive practice that became the subject of
proposals for mass tort reform was the seemingly excessive fees
plaintiffs’ attorneys were receiving, much of which were highly
disproportionate to the recovery actually received by the class.62 In
fact, entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ attorneys realized they could recover
higher fees for a representative lawsuit without having to exert the
same amount of effort needed if the claims were individually
resolved. Then, when such opportunistic lawyers discovered that
state courts provided a more lenient forum in which to litigate, class
action claims against large corporations increased by more than
300% in federal courts and in excess of 1000% in state courts.63
Specifically, the Senate Judiciary Committee noted that plaintiffs’
lawyers have been able to “game the system” for two primary
reasons: the requirement of complete diversity and the amount-incontroversy threshold.64 It is simple for the attorneys to add a named
plaintiff simply because of his or her residency, and the Committee
found that it “makes little sense” to require each claimant to show an
individual claim of $75,000 when the cases frequently involve tens of
millions of dollars.65 Furthermore, these attorneys began to
frequently agree to settle the classes’ claims by accepting coupon
settlements, which provide class members with low-value coupons to
purchase the very products or services that were the basis of their
initial claims, while still receiving significant monetary legal fees.66
Critics of class action litigation have also pointed out that the
propensity for plaintiffs’ lawyers to file allegedly frivolous lawsuits
and the potential for massive jury verdicts have generally been
sufficient to force corporations into settling unfounded claims or
deter otherwise honest corporations from expanding their
operations.67 Certain states had become known as “judicial hellholes”


60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Purcell, supra note 5, at 1852-53.
Id.
Id. at 1855.
See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 13 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 13-14.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Sherman, supra note 3, at 1614.
Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 462 (2000).
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by corporate defendants, because the judges routinely certified
classes of litigants when very few other jurisdictions would do so, and
the juries were particularly unsympathetic to corporate defendants.68
In particular, Madison County, Illinois admitted “that it applies ‘kind
of a loose’ and ‘liberal’ policy in allowing out-of-state asbestos
claimants to remain in the county[,] . . . routinely refus[ing] to
dismiss or transfer such cases.”69 Courts in Madison County have
been questioned for allowing “claims to proceed to trial where the
plaintiff and defendant are located out-of-state, the plaintiff’s
exposure occurred outside the state, medical treatment was provided
outside the state, no witnesses live in Illinois, and no evidence
relates to the state.”70
This mutation of class action claims along with a widespread
increase in the abusive practices described above served as a catalyst
for a renewed demand for mass tort reform. Additionally, the United
States Chamber of Commerce and academic commentators
attributed much of the abuse to state courts with a typically elected
judiciary, which led to increased support for Congress to expand
diversity jurisdiction in order to “provide a fairer and more impartial
federal court forum for interstate class actions.”71 Amid much debate
as to whether the motivation for the legislation was to increase
protection for powerful corporations or to truly reform the system so
that it may function in a fair and efficient manner, Congress’s
decisive response was the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 (CAFA)
According to the Senate Judiciary Committee, frequent abuses of
the class action process by overly aggressive attorneys and
sympathetic state judges have “undermine[d] the national judicial
system, the free flow of interstate commerce, and the concept of
diversity jurisdiction as intended by the framers of the United States
Constitution.”72 In response, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
was passed. Its stated purposes are to
(1) assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members with
legitimate claims;


68. Cameron Fredman, Plaintiffs’ Paradise Lost: Diversity of Citizenship and Amount
in Controversy under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 39 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 1025,
1028 (2006).
69. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Victor E. Schwartz et al., Asbestos Litigation in
Madison County, Illinois: The Challenge Ahead, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 235, 245 (2004)).
70. Schwartz et al., supra note 69, at 245.
71. Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Leah Lorber, Federal Courts Should
Decide Interstate Class Actions: A Call For Federal Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction
Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483, 510 (2000).
72. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005).
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(2) restore the intent of the framers of the United States
Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of
interstate cases of national importance under diversity
jurisdiction; and
(3) benefit society by encouraging innovation and lowering
consumer prices.73

In accordance with these purposes, CAFA outlines fundamental
changes that are intended to further these purposes. A highly
significant change implemented by CAFA is the expansion of federal
diversity jurisdiction to ensure that cases that truly effect interstate
commerce can be litigated in a federal court. However, there are local
controversy exceptions (referred to as carve-outs) that allow cases
with certain characteristics to remain in state court.74
The procedure for removal was altered in a way that negated the
ability of plaintiffs’ lawyers to avoid federal jurisdiction by naming
local defendants that have no true involvement in the claim or
claiming damages less than the amount-in-controversy.75
Additionally, appellate jurisdiction of remand decisions was
modified.76 Finally, a Consumer Bill of Rights was created that
requires an increased judicial scrutiny of coupon and net loss
settlements, bars increased compensation for class members located
near the court, and requires notice of proposed class settlements to
state and federal officials prior to final approval.77 These reform
efforts have effectively increased both the amount of class action
lawsuits originally filed in federal district courts as well as the
number of class actions that have been removed to federal court
under diversity jurisdiction.78
A. Thwarting the “Judicial Hellholes” of State Courts by Expanding
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction
As discussed in Part II, the Supreme Court had determined that
in order for a class action to be litigated in a federal court, there must
be complete diversity, requiring all named class representatives and
all defendants to be citizens of different states.79 In addition, the


73. Id.
74. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 27 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 27; see also
Allan Kanner, Interpreting the Class Action Fairness Act in a Truly Fair Manner, 80 TUL.
L. REV. 1645, 1646-47 (2006).
75. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 27.
76. Id. at 44.
77. Id. at 27.
78. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005 on the Federal Courts: Fourth Interim Report to the Judicial Conference
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR. 1 (Apr. 2008), http://www.fjc.gov/
public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafa0408.pdf/$file/cafa0408.pdf.
79. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365 (1921); Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806).
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claims of class members could not be aggregated,80 and at least one
class member had to have claims exceeding $75,000. Together, these
requirements made it extremely difficult for most class action
lawsuits to fulfill the federal diversity jurisdictional requirements.81
However, CAFA amended the diversity statute in order to ensure
that cases that should be litigated in a federal court actually get into
federal court. This expansion was achieved by adding an additional
provision, Subsection (d), which is specifically applicable to interstate
class actions filed under FRCP 23 or comparable state statutes. The
provision abrogates the requirement for complete diversity and
removes the limit on aggregation of the monetary values of the
claims.82 Now, federal courts have original jurisdiction if a class has
at least 100 members (named or not), maintains citizenship that is
diverse from any one defendant, and has claims exceeding $5 million
in the aggregate.83
However, even when these requirements have been met, the
federal district court must still ensure that the class action does not
fulfill the elements established in the local controversy or home state
controversy exceptions, otherwise known as carve-outs, before it may
choose to exercise federal jurisdiction.84 In addition, defendants in
actions that were initially filed in state court still have the right to
remove the action to federal court if the action could have been
originally filed in federal court.85
B. “Carve-outs” from Federal Jurisdiction: the Exceptions That
Allow Class Actions to Remain in State Court
Although § 1332(d)(2) did significantly expand the scope of federal
diversity jurisdiction, there are still the carve-outs.86 These


80. Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 296-97 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S.
332, 338 (1969).
81. See Scott L. Nelson, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: An Analysis, 2005 ABA
Annual Meeting 3-4 (Aug. 4-7, 2005), http://www.classactionlitigation.com/aba_cafa_analysis.pdf.
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006) now reads as follows:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and is a class action in which—
(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from
any defendant;
(B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or
subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or
(C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any
defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state.
Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. § 1441(a).
84. Id. § 1332(d)(3)-(4).
85. Id. § 1332(d)(2)-(5)(B).
86. Sherman, supra note 3, at 1596-97.
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exceptions generally serve to ensure that certain types of cases
remain in state court. There are both mandatory and permissive
exceptions.87 The mandatory exceptions apply to class actions that
involve either a local controversy or home state controversy. The
permissive exception is based upon the discretion of the federal
district court, although the court is provided with statutorilymandated criteria to utilize in its determination.88
The local controversy exception provides that a federal court must
decline jurisdiction if all of the following are met: (1) More than twothirds of the proposed class come from the state “in which the action
was . . . filed”; (2) “[A]t least 1 defendant . . . from whom significant
relief is sought” is from “the State in which the action was . . . filed”
and that defendant’s “conduct forms a significant basis for the claims
asserted”; (3) The “principal injuries . . . were incurred in the State in
which the action was originally filed”; and (4) No other class action
was filed within three years asserting the same allegations.89
Additionally, under the home state controversy exception, a federal
court must decline jurisdiction if two-thirds or more of the class
members and primary defendants are from the state in which the
action was filed.90
A federal district court may utilize the discretionary approach to
decline to exercise jurisdiction over a class action if two elements are
met. First, between one-third and two-thirds of all class members are
citizens of the state in which the action was initially filed.91 Second,
the primary defendants are citizens of the forum state.92 If both these
elements are met, then the court may decline jurisdiction if it is “in
the interests of justice and looking at the totality of the
circumstances.”93 The court’s determination regarding the interests of
justice and the totality of circumstances involves the application of a
six-factor balancing test that measures the extent of the local nature
of the controversy and the appropriateness and effectiveness of
applying federal jurisdiction.94
Factor A questions whether the claims “involve matters of
national or interstate interest.”95 If answered affirmatively, the court
should feel more inclined to exercise federal jurisdiction. Factor B
considers whether the law to be applied to the claims is that of the


87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id. at 1596-1603.
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4(a)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 9-10 (2005).
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I)-(II).
Id. § 1332(d)(4)(B).
Id. § 1332(d)(3).
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. § 1332(d)(3)(A).
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initial forum or of various other states.96 The more local the law to be
applied, the more likely it will be for the court to decline jurisdiction.
Factor C questions whether the case was artfully pled to avoid
federal jurisdiction, which is indicative of the drafters’ intent to
thwart plaintiffs’ attorneys from doing this.97 If the complaint was
artfully pled in a way to avoid federal jurisdiction, the court should
feel more inclined to exercise federal jurisdiction.98
Factor D requires the court to look at any potential distinct nexus
that may exist between the original forum state and the class
members, alleged claims, or the defendants.99 Factor E examines
whether there are substantially more class members that reside in
states other than the forum state and if they are widely dispersed
throughout these additional states.100 If the court finds that the
members who are widely dispersed elsewhere outweigh the members
in the forum, it is more of an interstate conflict and the court should
choose to exercise federal jurisdiction.101 Lastly, Factor F questions
whether a substantially similar claim or the same claim has been
filed in the last three years, either by the same class members or
others.102 If so, this would indicate a more widespread problem that
should be handled by federal courts. There are several ambiguous
aspects of each of these provisions governing when a federal court
should, or may, choose to decline federal jurisdiction. They are
further analyzed in Part IV.
C. Easing the Restrictions on Removal
Prior to the passage of CAFA, there were specific restrictions that
applied if a defendant desired to remove a case from state to federal
court. First, a defendant could not remove a case if the defendant was
a resident of the state in which the claim was originally filed.103
Additionally, if there were multiple defendants, all the defendants
had to consent to removal in order for it to be proper.104 Finally,
Congress had issued an express, one-year time restriction on the
removal of cases when the original jurisdiction would have been
based on diversity, rather than a federal question.105


96. Id. § 1332(d)(3)(B).
97. Id. § 1332(d)(3)(C).
98. Sarah S. Vance, A Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TUL. L. REV.
1617, 1626 (2006).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)(D).
100. Id. § 1332(d)(3)(E).
101. See Sherman, supra note 3, at 1602.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)(F).
103. Id. § 1441(b).
104. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 248 (1900).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).

694

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:679

CAFA amended and essentially removed all three of these
requirements, which had traditionally been barriers to federal
jurisdiction for many class action cases. Now, the action may be
removed “without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of the
State in which the action is brought,”106 which effectively undercuts
the past practice of plaintiffs’ attorneys who frequently would name a
plaintiff or defendant in the action in order to avoid diversity
jurisdiction. The defendant may remove a case without the consent of
other defendants.107 Additionally, the one-year time limitation on
removal of claims based upon diversity jurisdiction is similarly no
longer applicable.108
D. Reconsidering Remand Orders and Expanding the Power of
Appellate Courts
Prior to CAFA, a litigant had very little recourse, if any at all, to
challenge a decision regarding removal from state to federal court. If
a federal district court had retained jurisdiction upon removal, the
decision was not permitted to be reviewed until the entire case had
been adjudicated.109 Moreover, if a federal court determined that
removal was improper and remanded the case to state court, the
remand order was barred from being reviewed on appeal.110 CAFA
now provides access to appellate review. An order remanding a class
action to state court may now be reviewed by appeal at the appellate
court’s discretion.111 There are statutorily-mandated timeframes
within which this review must take place. These timing elements are
discussed in further detail in Part IV.112


106. Id. § 1453(b).
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 750 (1946); Texas v. Real Parties in Interest,
259 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 548
(5th Cir. 1981)).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
111. Id. § 1453(c).
112. See infra Part IV. The original text of 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) read as follows:
(1) IN GENERAL.— Section 1447 shall apply to any removal of a case under
this section, except that notwithstanding section 1447(d), a court of appeals
may accept an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying a
motion to remand a class action to the State court from which it was removed if
application is made to the court of appeals not less than 7 days after entry of
the order.
(2) TIME PERIOD FOR JUDGMENT.— If the court of appeals accepts an appeal
under paragraph (1), the court shall complete all action on such appeal,
including rendering judgment, not later than 60 days after the date on which
such appeal was filed, unless an extension is granted under paragraph (3).
Id. (amended 2009).
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IV. INTERPRETATION OF AMBIGUOUS PROVISIONS
A. Statutory Interpretation as it has Developed and a Brief
Comparison of the Purposivist and Textualist Approaches.
The field of statutory interpretation has substantially evolved
from its early foundation of the Blackstonian vision of balancing law
and equity into the modern legal process school that primarily
113
focuses on statutory purpose. Judge Posner found Hart and Sacks’
legal process framework to be a good starting point, but felt that it
114
needed a dose of reality. Additionally, Judge Posner felt that the
methodology of economics needed to be applied to the democratic
marketplace of the legislature because legislators were frequently not
“reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably” and
115
statutes frequently do not embody broad public policy purposes.
This realistic approach asserted that although statutes are
frequently just the result of compromises made between lawmakers
or special interest groups, if judges are given the discretion to
completely disregard the statutory purpose, then there is the
potential risk of attributing the judge’s conception of the public
interest rather than the purposes one can reasonably infer from the
116
actual legislation.
Judge Posner advocated for the concept of
“imaginative reconstruction,” which involves the judge attempting to
put himself in the mindset of the enacting legislature, thus acting as
the faithful agent of the enacting legislature by following the lines of
117
the legislative compromise.
However, Judge Easterbrook has consistently taken a more textbased approach that “[j]udges . . . . carry out decisions they do not
118
make.” This perception of the honest agent concept rejects the idea
that a judge must reconstruct the mindset of the enacting legislature
119
and instead imposes a duty of “clear statement” on the legislature.
In order to give proper deference to the legislature under the
principle of separation of powers, Judge Easterbrook postured that
“unless the statute plainly hands courts the power to create and
revise a form of common law, the domain of the statute should be

113. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 48A:3 (7th ed. 2007).
114. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 819 (1983).
115. Id. at 819; see also Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 181 (1986).
116. Posner, supra note 114, at 819.
117. Id. at 817.
118. Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 60 (1984).
119. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544-45 (1983)
(internal quotation and citation omitted).
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restricted to cases anticipated by its framers and expressly resolved
120
in the legislative process.” Judges should only apply the law to an
area where the law is intended to apply, and the plain meaning
121
should be interpreted within the scope of the statute.
In
determining the scope of the statute, “[i]f the question of a statute’s
domain may not often be resolved by reference to actual design, it
122
may never properly be resolved by reference to imputed design.”
Perhaps the most well-known proponent of the textualism
approach is Justice Scalia, whose plain meaning rule shares common
characteristics with Judge Easterbrook’s clear statement principle.
Justice Scalia has harshly criticized the Court’s past reliance on
123
legislative history as an aid in interpreting statutes. Instead, he
argues that the Court should rely in most cases on a statute’s plain
meaning, which can be derived from an ordinary understanding of
124
the words and structure of statutory text. “[C]ontext is everything”
when interpreting a statute; one should consider the words in the
125
statute, how a statute operates in the bill, the structure of the
statute, the common usage of the grammar and syntax, and the
dictionary meaning behind the words in a statute. Therefore, Justice
Scalia will consult certain extrinsic sources beyond the statutory text.
Justice Scalia has firmly established his view that legislative
intent is not, as many others argue, the dispositive key to statutory
interpretation.126 His approach to statutory interpretation rests
primarily on his perception of the structure of our government,
particularly the separation of powers principle, which ensures that
duties remain with the proper branch of government pursuant to the
Constitution.127 Justice Scalia is a devout proponent of the concept
that, based on the Constitutional provisions of bicameralism and
presentment, the plain language of enacted legislation should be the
controlling authority, because only the text is the law.128
Justice Scalia’s objection to the use of legislative history in
statutory interpretation is partially based on his doubt that it holds
true evidentiary value, because he does not consider legislative
history to be sufficiently reliable.129 Yet another significant qualm


120. Id. at 544.
121. Id. at 535-36.
122. Id. at 537.
123. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 3, 22-23 (Amy Gutmann et al. eds., 1997).
124. See id. at 29-30.
125. See id. at 37.
126. Id. at 32-36.
127. Id. at 35.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 32-34.
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that he has with its use is that judges cannot be trusted with
absolute discretion to utilize this sort of material.130 Given the
abundance of legislative history and the absence of a reliable way to
infer actual legislative intent from those materials, he believes that
judges will end up using legislative history selectively.131 Reliance on
legislative history thus leads to judicial subjectivism.132 According to
Justice Scalia, “ ‘[w]e use them [(committee reports)] when it is
convenient, and ignore them when it is not,’ ”133 and it is “dangerous
to assume that, even with the utmost self-discipline, judges can
prevent the implications they see from mirroring the policies they
favor” when relying on legislative history.134
In opposition to the textualist approach, there is another school of
thought, purposivism, which has garnered a significant amount of
support. Professor Farber, a well-known purposivist, would advocate
for a more synthesized approach that incorporates the legislative
history of CAFA to determine both the areas addressed in ambiguous
terms, as well as those that were not addressed at all.135 As the name
indicates, supporters of this type of interpretation believe that
extrinsic sources must be consulted to ascertain the enacting
legislature’s purpose. For instance, Professor Farber has asserted
that the honest agent theory oversimplifies the agency model,
because it does not take into account that agents act on their
principals’ behalf rather than just robotically executing orders.136
Additionally, he asserted that another flaw is that federal judges are
not the agents of Congress but of the United States.137 Therefore,
“their ultimate allegiance is to the Constitution,” and “it is the courts’
role to carry out congressional directives in light of their
understanding of [those duties mandated by] the Constitution.”138
Professor Farber also pointed out that although the supremacy
principle does dictate that the judiciary must pay deference to the
legislature, it does not automatically situate the judiciary in a
subordinate position.139
Clearly, these approaches have significant differentiating
characteristics and both have garnered praise and criticism. From


130. See id. at 34.
131. Id. at 35-36.
132. Id.
133. Fritz Snyder, Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and
the Tenth Circuit, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 573, 580 (1996) (second alteration in original) (quoting
Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 617 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
134. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
135. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO.
L.J. 281, 286 (1989).
136. Id. at 284.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 318.
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the Supreme Court to the lower courts, it is evident that judges have
taken different approaches to comparable situations. This is evident
from the way courts have addressed the ambiguous provisions of
CAFA thus far. The resulting inconsistent applications of CAFA
should motivate Congress to enact corrective legislation.
B. Applying Both Approaches to CAFA’s Silence on the Burden of
Proof for Federal Jurisdiction and How Textualism Prevails
The question under CAFA of whether the burden of proving
federal jurisdiction is on the removing party or on the party
advocating for remand has incited the most significant amount of
judicial interpretation concerns. CAFA does not contain a provision
that explicitly changes the long-standing common law rule that the
party seeking removal has the burden of proving federal jurisdiction.
However, there were unequivocal and numerous references in the
House Sponsors’ Statement and the Senate Judiciary Committee
Report that indicated the drafter’s intent to shift the burden to the
plaintiff objecting to removal to demonstrate that the jurisdictional
requirements had not been met.140 The Chairman of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, Representative F. James
Sensenbrenner, inserted the House Sponsors’ Statement into the
congressional record, which read in part that “if a purported class
action is removed under these jurisdictional provisions, the named
plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of demonstrating that the removal
was improper.”141 However, the House Sponsors’ Statement was not
inserted into the congressional record until after CAFA had
been enacted.142
Moreover, placing the burden on the party objecting to removal
would be consistent with CAFA’s intent to broaden federal diversity
jurisdiction, because a class action would presumptively remain in
federal court unless the objecting party could make an affirmative
showing that the case should be remanded.143 The Senate Report
expressed a similar sentiment by including the following statement:
If a purported class action is removed pursuant to these
jurisdictional provisions, the named plaintiff(s) should bear the
burden of demonstrating that the removal was improvident (i.e.,
that the applicable jurisdictional requirements are not satisfied).
And if a federal court is uncertain about whether “all matters in
controversy” in a purported class action “do not in the aggregate


140. 151 CONG. REC. H727 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005); see also S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4244 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 40-42.
141. 151 CONG. REC. H727 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005).
142. Jeffrey L. Roether, Interpreting Congressional Silence: CAFA’s Jurisdictional Burden
of Proof in Post-Removal Remand Proceedings, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2745, 2764 (2007).
143. Id. at 2763.
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exceed the sum or value of $5,000,000,” the court should err in
favor of exercising jurisdiction over the case.144

Several federal courts have determined that there was a sufficient
amount of legislative intent expressed in the legislative reports to
justify abrogating the common law rule, thus requiring the party
objecting to removal to bear the burden.145 These courts generally
held that under CAFA, the burden of removal is on the party
opposing removal to prove that remand is appropriate.146 This
determination was based on the numerous statements made by the
drafters by CAFA, along with the committee reports that
accompanied the Senate bill, which those courts interpreted as
indication of a desire to deviate from the common law rule.
Furthermore, the court in Berry v. American Express Publishing
Corporation held that this departure from common law tradition
furthers the stated purpose of CAFA to expand the scope of federal
diversity jurisdiction.147
Subsequent to these decisions, however, several appellate courts
and federal district courts have been openly critical of the practice
utilized by the earlier courts and labeled them as acting outside the
bounds of judicial authority.148 For example, the Second Circuit
pointed out that “it would be thoroughly unsound . . . to reject a
longstanding rule absent an explicit directive from Congress. We
presume that Congress, when it enacted CAFA, knew where the
burden of proof had traditionally been placed. By its silence, we


144. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 42.
145. See, e.g., Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 161, 168 (D. Mass. 2005)
(maintaining that under CAFA, the party seeking remand bears burden of proof that
federal jurisdiction does not exist); Waitt v. Merck & Co., No. C05-0759L, 2005 WL
1799740, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2005) (determining that CAFA’s legislative history
effectively shifted responsibility to prove the impropriety of removal on the party seeking
remand); see also, e.g., Berry v. Am. Express Publ’g Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1122-23
(C.D. Cal. 2005) (noting that pre-CAFA diversity jurisdiction statute is void of language
regarding allocation of burden of proof on remand).
146. Berry, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1121-23 (Holding that, with respect to CAFA, “the
Committee Report expresses a clear intention to place the burden of removal on the party
opposing removal to demonstrate that an interstate class action should be remanded to
state court.” (emphasis added)). The court also noted that the report “states that ‘[i]t is the
Committee’s intention with regard to each of these exceptions that the party opposing
federal jurisdiction shall have the burden of demonstrating the applicability of an
exemption.’ ” Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 44).
147. Berry, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1121.
148. DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of N.Y., LLC, 469 F.3d 271, 275 (2d Cir. 2006)
(concluding that Congress’s silence regarding burden of proof failed to alter traditional
rule); see also Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding
that the removing party continues to bear the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction on
remand motion and implicitly overruling district court decisions in Waitt and Berry); Brill
v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that none of
CAFA's language “is even arguably relevant” to this burden-shifting argument); Moniz v.
Bayer A.G., 447 F. Supp. 2d 31, 34 (D. Mass. 2006) (rejecting proffered argument to shift
burden of proof because Abrego Abrego implicitly overruled Natale).
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conclude that Congress chose not to alter that rule.”149 The Ninth
Circuit additionally held that this silence regarding the burden issue
creates a presumption that Congress was aware of the legal context
in which it was legislating.150 The legal context at the time the 109th
Congress passed CAFA into law featured a longstanding, nearcanonical rule that the burden on removal rested with the
removing defendant.151
Had the drafters wanted the burden of proof to shift, they would
have explicitly included such a provision within the text of CAFA so
that it would be uniformly accepted by class action practitioners and
uniformly applied by the judiciary. Courts should not now defer to
the legislative history when, as Judge “Easterbrook argued[,]
legislatures cannot have intents or purposes.”152 Legislatures “have
‘only outcomes,’ not ‘intents’ or ‘designs.’ ”153
Furthermore, many courts and legal commentators have asserted
that ambiguous language rather than mere silence in statutory text
is required in order to resort to legislative history. The Ninth Circuit
explained that the consideration of legislative history can only be
appropriate where statutory language is ambiguous, because that is
a necessary condition before interpretation should occur.154
Professor Eskridge advocates for a more active approach and has
developed a unique precept of the legislative supremacy principle
that involves three central themes: (1) “under any rigorous theory of
statutory interpretation, legislative supremacy not only tolerates, but
requires judges to” look beyond the statutory text and consider
applicable situations “not contemplated by the original drafters”; (2)
the assumptions upon which “the countermajoritarian difficulty with
statutory interpretation” rest are generally controversial and may
benefit from further questioning; and (3) the nature of interpretation


149. DiTolla, 469 F.3d at 275 (citation omitted).
150. Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 684; see, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677,
696-97 (1979) (“It is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like
other citizens, know the law . . . .”); United States v. LeCoe, 936 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir.
1991) (“Congress is, of course, presumed to know existing law pertinent to any new
legislation it enacts.”).
151. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1996);
Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1992).
152. Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 252 (1992) (Easterbrook, supra note 119,
at 547-48).
153. Id. at 253 (quoting Easterbrook, supra note 119, at 547).
154. See Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 683-84; see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (“Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory
interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature's
understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.”); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76
n.3 (1984) (“ ‘Resort to legislative history is only justified where the face of the Act is
inescapably ambiguous . . . .’ ”) (quoting Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341
U.S. 384, 395-96 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
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outweighs the importance of legislative supremacy in order to create
a bridge between the past and present meanings.155 Here, Professor
Eskridge would apply his precept by looking beyond the silence in
CAFA regarding the jurisdictional burden to examine the supporting
documentation, make note of the stated intentions of the drafters to
shift the burden, and likely conclude that the common law tradition
had been usurped.
However, the numerous courts that have refused to abrogate the
common law tradition regarding the burden of proof for removal
proceedings do so pursuant to the canon of interpretation that
“statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly
construed.”156 Professor Shapiro explicates that this canon conforms
to a desirable “judicial tendency to favor continuity over change.”157
Additionally, his discussion regarding the merits of the canon posits
that it should be viewed as “an analog to the more favorably viewed
presumption against implied repeal of an existing statute.”158 This
favorable view of the canon is especially valid in the context of such a
long-standing common law tradition as the one allocating the burden
of proof for removal, which has been utilized by practitioners and the
judiciary for a countless number of years.
In his criticism of the general deference paid by courts to
legislative history, Judge Easterbrook has explained:
[W]hen the legislative history stands by itself, as a naked
expression of “intent” unconnected to any enacted text, it has no
more force than an opinion poll of legislators—less, really, as it
speaks for fewer. Thirteen Senators signed this report and five
voted not to send the proposal to the floor. Another 82 Senators did
not express themselves on the question; likewise 435 Members of
the House and one President kept their silence. . . .
. . . [N]aked legislative history has no legal effect . . . . The rule
that the proponent of federal jurisdiction bears the risk of nonpersuasion has been around for a long time. To change such a rule,
Congress must enact a statute with the President’s signature (or
by a two-thirds majority to override a veto). A declaration by 13
Senators will not serve.159

Although both Professors Farber and Eskridge make valid points,
Judge Easterbrook’s position exposes a flaw in the purposivist
argument, which provided the basis for the decisions of the earlier


155. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319,
322 (1989).
156. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 921, 925 (1992) (discussing the role that canons play in the process of
statutory construction).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 937.
159. Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2005).
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judicially active courts. The purposivist approach may promote the
advantages of using legislative history in statutory interpretation, but
to rely on the statements included in the Senate Report would
essentially allow the authority of an “opinion poll of legislators” to
abrogate common law rule. Judge Easterbrook’s discussion makes it
apparent that courts should continue to focus on the clear statement
in the statutory text. Here, the text is silent. Thus, without an explicit
statutory directive, it is reckless for the judiciary to take an active
role; courts should continue to defer to the long-standing tradition of
placing the burden on the party seeking federal jurisdiction.
However, the disparity between the statutory language of CAFA
and the relevant legislative history does indicate a desire, by at least
some members of Congress, to change this tradition. This significant
ambiguity has resulted in differing judicial interpretations of the
jurisdictional provisions.160 A corrective measure by Congress to
specifically allocate the burden of proof would alleviate this dilemma.
Courts would then be able to consistently apply and utilize CAFA’s
provisions in order to further the stated purposes articulated
by Congress.
C. Easing the Restrictions on Removal
Although CAFA did expand the scope of federal diversity, the
carve-outs described in Part III allow certain types of class actions to
remain in state court. Thresholds within the local controversy and
home-state controversy exceptions either require or allow federal
courts to decline exercising federal jurisdiction. Whether mandatory
or permissive, there are ambiguous requirements, legal terms, and
recommended criteria within all of the exceptions that have led to a
significant amount of dispute and interpretation.
The most prominent example of an ambiguous legal term is the
reference to “primary defendants” in both the statute governing
mandatory abstention161 and the statute governing when a federal
court is permitted to decline jurisdiction.162 The term primary
defendant was not explicitly defined in CAFA. However, the
legislative history describes the primary defendants as the “real
‘targets’ of the lawsuit” (the individuals expected to incur the


160. Berry, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1121-23 (Holding that, with respect to CAFA, “the
Committee Report expresses a clear intention to place the burden of removal on the party
opposing removal to demonstrate that an interstate class action should be remanded to
state court.” (emphasis added)). But see DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of N.Y., LLC, 469 F.3d
271, 275 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that Congress’s silence regarding burden of proof failed
to alter traditional rule). See also Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448
(7th Cir. 2005) (noting that none of CAFA's language “is even arguably relevant” to this
burden-shifting argument).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4) (2006).
162. Id. § 1332(d)(3).
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majority of the loss) and as any defendant that would be liable to a
majority of the class.163 Contrarily, there is nearly a complete dearth
of information regarding the meaning of a “significant defendant.”
According to one legal commentator, there are four potential
definitions of
“primary defendant”: (1) a defendant against whom significant
relief is sought; (2) a defendant whose alleged conduct forms a
significant basis for the claims asserted; (3) a defendant
characterized by both significant relief and significant culpable
conduct . . . ; or (4) a defendant characterized by either significant
relief or significant culpable conduct.164

One court has found that a defendant was deemed primary when the
whole class sought significant injunctive relief from him, even though
he was a target of only one of eight plaintiffs’ claims.165 “The Oxford
English Dictionary defines ‘primary’ as ‘[o]f the first or highest rank
or importance,’ ” which implies that among many multiple defendants,
there would be one who ranks as “primary” and all others would
not.166 A modern textualist like Justice Scalia would be willing to
consult such an objective resource in order to reach the most
reasonable construction of the text.167
However, one district court has focused more on the defendant’s
alleged conduct, rather than on whether the defendant is the one
against whom the majority of the relief was sought, in determining
the application of the term “primary defendant.”168 This court’s
application of the term would fall within the second definition. The
third definition, requiring both significant relief sought and direct
liability, may result in no defendants being designated primary,
which is not workable.169 The fourth definition appears to be a
rational compromise, which allows the designation if either
significant relief or direct liability is satisfied.170
The plain language of these provisions in CAFA does not provide
much guidance for determining where the line is drawn between
primary, significant, and the remaining defendants in a class action.
Beyond the statutory text, there is no further instruction to be


163. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 43 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 41; Vance,
supra note 98, at 1623.
164. Fredman, supra note 68, at 1043-44.
165. Hangarter v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., No. C 05-04558 WHA, 2006 WL 213834, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2006).
166. Fredman, supra note 68, at 1042 (alteration in original) (quoting 12 OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 472 (2d ed. 1989)).
167. See Scalia, supra note 123, at 23.
168. Adams v. Fed. Materials Co., No. Civ. A. 5:05CV-90-R, 2005 WL 1862378, at *5
(W.D. Ky. July 28, 2005).
169. Fredman, supra note 68, at 1047.
170. Id. at 1047-48.
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garnered from the legislative history, which at least serves to
alleviate a potential debate between textualists and purposivists
regarding whether to utilize the legislative history. Regardless of the
ambiguities that exist due to the legislative history, Judge
Easterbrook correctly noted that “[w]e interpret texts. The invocation
of disembodied purposes, reasons cut loose from language, is a sure
way to frustrate rather than implement these texts.”171 Therefore,
this area of CAFA would greatly benefit from a corrective measure by
Congress to specifically delineate the requirements and thresholds
for both a primary and significant defendant.
D. The Scrivener’s Error for Appellate Review of a Remand Decision
That Congress Fixed Without Judicial Interpretation
Another significant change to class action procedure effectuated
by CAFA is its provision allowing for immediate review of
jurisdictional decisions; more specifically, it changed the
determination as to whether a case may be removed from state to
federal court. When a decision is made to remove a case or to deny
removal and remand the case to state court, CAFA authorizes review
of the decision, but only “if application is made to the court of appeals
not less than 7 days after entry of the order.”172 The wording of this
requisite time limit resulted in a significant amount of controversy
and litigation. There is an unprecedented amount of legislative
history that indicates the drafters of CAFA intended for there to be a
seven-day deadline to promote judicial efficiency, rather than the
seven-day waiting period, which resulted from the language that was
actually enacted.173
For instance, when CAFA was being considered by the Senate
Committee, a report was issued describing the reasoning for allowing


171. Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 310 (7th Cir. 1986).
172. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added) (amended 2009). The actual text of
this provision as originally enacted was as follows:
(c) REVIEW OF REMAND ORDERS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 1447 shall apply to any removal of a case under this
section, except that notwithstanding section 1447(d), a court of appeals may
accept an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying a motion
to remand a class action to the State court from which it was removed if
application is made to the court of appeals not less than 7 days after entry of
the order.
(2) TIME PERIOD FOR JUDGMENT.—If the court of appeals accepts an appeal
under paragraph (1), the court shall complete all action on such appeal,
including rendering judgment, not later than 60 days after the date on which
such appeal was filed, unless an extension is granted under paragraph (3).
Id. § 1453(c)(1), (2) (emphasis added).
173. Adam N. Steinman, “Less” is “More”? Textualism, Intentionalism, and a Better
Solution to the Class Action Fairness Act's Appellate Deadline Riddle, 92 IOWA L. REV.
1183, 1212-13 (2007).
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appellate review of removal decisions. It was noted that one purpose
of the provision was “ ‘to develop a body of appellate law interpreting
[CAFA] without unduly delaying the litigation of class actions.’ ”174
The Committee went on to describe the imposition of time limits on
such review. In fact, the report stipulated that the “ ‘[n]ew subsection
1453(c) provides discretionary appellate review [of remand orders
under this legislation] but also imposes time limits. Specifically,
parties must file a notice of appeal within seven days after entry of a
remand order.”175 Additionally, the appeals court shall issue a final
decision on the appeal within 60 days.176 However, if the parties
agree, they may extend the time limit; or the court may, on its own,
grant an extension of no more than ten days.177
Courts differed on how to apply the actual provision allowing for
appeals when the application to review was made “not less than
seven days after entry of the order.”178 The Tenth Circuit was the
first court to deal with the issue of how to interpret the “not less than
7 days.”179 After reviewing the Senate Report that explicitly stated
the drafters intended to impose a seven-day limit on applications for
review, the court concluded that the seven-day provision was a
scrivener’s error and the provision was intended to impose a sevenday deadline rather than the waiting period as written.180 This
holding completely went against the plain text of the statute,
although Judge Ebel of the Tenth Circuit reasoned that such a
deviation was permissible in situations where a “ ‘literal application
of the statute [would] produce a result demonstrably at odds with the
intentions of its drafters.’ ”181
The Eleventh Circuit also adopted the same approach as the
Tenth Circuit by finding that a literal reading of CAFA’s appellate
provision “ ‘would produce an absurd result.’ ”182 The Third Circuit in
Morgan v. Gay also concurred with the decision in Pritchett by
referring to the legislative history and determining that to rule that
the provision required a seven-day waiting period would, in fact,
allow the parties to potentially abuse the system by strategically
waiting to appeal the remand decision and delay the case for a
greater amount of time than necessary.183 The Ninth Circuit agreed

174. Id. at 1195 (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 49 (2005),
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 46).
175. Id. at 1195 (quoting S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 49).
176. § 1453(c)(2).
177. Id. § 1453(c)(3).
178. Steinman, supra 173, at 1196.
179. Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1093 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005).
180. Id. at 1093 n.2.
181. Id. at 1093 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)).
182. Steinman, supra note 173, at 1199 (quoting Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d
1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2006)).
183. Morgan v. Gay, 466 F.3d 276, 278 (3rd Cir. 2006).
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with this approach although a large number of dissenters to the sua
sponte call for en banc rehearing of the case argued that the
“scrivener’s error” exception should not have applied in that case.184
Those on the panel who advocated a correctionist approach did
concede they were not taking part in interpretation per se, but rather
were replacing terms in the statutory text altogether in order to
comport with the legislative intent and ensure that otherwise absurd
results did not occur.185
The dissenters on the Ninth Circuit wrote a lengthy criticism of
the stance taken by those correctionists who chose to ignore “the
supremacy of the legislature.”186 Specifically, Judge Bybee stated that
the panel chose to ignore the plain meaning of the text in order to
substitute legislative history, which was an abuse of “judicial power,”
and that interpretative aids should not be utilized when the language
is plain and ambiguous as was CAFA’s provision outlining a
timeframe for appeals.187 Judge Bybee was additionally concerned
about this practice, because such a sharp deviation from the
language of the law would essentially result in depriving citizens of
knowing the law on which they may rely in conducting their affairs
so that they will not engage in unlawful conduct.188 Although Judge
Bybee and others—who have advocated strict adherence to the plain
text of the CAFA provision189—provided a valid basis for their
approach, even strict textualists, such as Justice Scalia, permit
interpretation to a certain extent by applying the absurdity doctrine
or scrivener’s error exceptions in rare circumstances similar to that
which resulted from applying the CAFA provision as it was written.190
In 2009, Congress responded to the controversy, conflicting
judicial decisions, and criticism by academic legal commentators by
amending this provision.191 The 2009 amendment struck out “not less
than 7 days” and inserted “not more than 10 days” 192 to fully comport
with the legislative history that had indicated an intent to limit
applications for review to a short period of time. This puts to rest the
issue of which interpretative method to utilize in order to effectively


184. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d
1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2006) (Bybee, J., dissenting).
185. See Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 435
F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 448 F.3d 1092.
186. Amalgamated, 448 F.3d at 1099 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 1094-96.
188. Id. at 1100.
189. Id. at 1095-96.
190. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 117, 145-46 (2009) (citing Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-30
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
191. Statutory Time-Periods Technical Amendments Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-16, §
6(2), 123 Stat. 1607, 1608.
192. Id.
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apply this time limit and demonstrates that courts do not need to
look beyond the text interpreting a statute, because Congress can
uniformly resolve an ambiguity with a corrective amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
In order for courts to fulfill Congress’s stated purposes behind the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 of fairness and efficiency, they
need to receive proper guidance through clear and unambiguous
statutory language. Although it may be impossible to conceive of a
legislative reform of this magnitude without ambiguities arising,
there are corrective measures that should be taken by Congress to
provide greater clarity. These include amending the diversity
jurisdiction statute to specifically place the burden of proof for federal
diversity jurisdiction on either the removing party or the party
seeking remand to state court. Furthermore, the terminology utilized
in the exceptions to the expansion of federal jurisdiction, specifically
the references to primary defendants, should be legislatively
clarified. Finally, courts must be provided with definitive criteria
regarding their duty in determining whether a settlement is “fair,
reasonable, and adequate,” along with what the term “coupon”
encompasses in order to comply with CAFA’s intent to prevent the
abusive practices of unscrupulous attorneys. Beyond these areas of
ambiguity that require legislative clarification, CAFA has been
moderately successful thus far in expanding federal diversity
jurisdiction in an effort to make class action litigation more
consistent, equitable, and efficient.

